Unchained

Uneasy Money: What the $6B Binance Hack Revealed About Who Can Freeze Stolen Funds

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Key takeaways

  • The Binance theft did not exploit Aave itself; the attacker used Aave to supply about $60 million of USDT and borrow roughly $45 million of ETH while trying to evade stablecoin freezes.
  • Aave’s emergency market freeze blocks new supplies and loans but preserves repayment, withdrawals, and liquidations, so existing users are not trapped.
  • Risk controls must balance legitimate liquidity and immediate access against the possibility that a single attacker can create enormous exposure in one block.
  • Adam argues that future DeFi defense needs automated, fast, verifiable controls whose permitted actions remain bounded by the protocol and its governance.
  • Kain warns that every new oracle or emergency-control component adds complexity and therefore creates its own failure surface.
  • Taylor argues that once a protocol has the ability to stop sanctioned stolen funds, refusing to use that ability can create serious legal risk, as she believes happened with THORChain.

Summary

The $6 billion Binance theft triggered an emergency response

Kain Warwick and Taylor Monahan describe the Binance incident as roughly $6 billion moving out of the exchange, with Taylor particularly annoyed that North Korea could convert the proceeds into more nuclear capability. Adam Sadowski joins on behalf of LlamaRisk, Aave’s risk provider. Taylor says she was unexpectedly calm because the crypto industry had endured enough crises to make this feel like a six-billion-dollar incident to handle rather than a reason to panic. A ZeroShadow alert spotted a large Binance outflow, prompting teams to coordinate with Tether, Circle, Binance, and affected protocols.

Aave was not hacked; the attacker used it as an exit route

Adam explains that no funds were stolen from Aave itself. The protocol continued operating as designed: users supplied collateral and took overcollateralized loans, while suppliers retained the ability to withdraw their funds. About $3 billion in mostly stablecoins reached Ethereum, and the attacker initially routed funds through decentralized-exchange pools before moving part of the haul through Aave roughly 35 minutes into the exploit. They supplied about $60 million of USDT and borrowed approximately $45 million in ETH, apparently to escape stablecoins that Tether and Circle might freeze.

Aave froze new exposure without trapping existing users

LlamaRisk and Aave teams worked into the night to freeze the affected markets. Adam stresses that an Aave market freeze does not confiscate or lock users’ assets: new borrowing and supplying are disabled, but users can repay debt and withdraw collateral, and liquidations continue normally. He characterizes the mechanism as a one-way valve—users can exit, but no new exposure can enter. The attacker’s position used the maximum permitted loan-to-value with little buffer; after ETH rose, it began moving toward liquidation, meaning the borrowed ETH could ultimately be recovered through the normal liquidation process.

The debate over allowing a billion-dollar ETH short

Taylor asks whether it is sensible for someone to deposit $1 billion in stablecoins in one block and borrow nearly all available ETH, even if the transaction is technically legitimate. Adam says Aave’s parameters reflect the liquidity and risk of assets such as USDT and WETH, and supplying stablecoins to borrow ETH can be a valid way to short ETH. He agrees that exposure limits are a trade-off: tighter limits reduce emergency risk but can impair organic market activity. LlamaRisk is developing risk-oracle controls that limit borrowing over time, while acknowledging that attackers can split activity across Sybil accounts.

Aave’s manual guardians are too slow for automated attackers

Adam says Aave currently delegates emergency risk actions to a risk steward and a four-of-seven guardian multisig. LlamaRisk and Aave Labs jointly operate the steward, while the guardians can freeze markets or set loan-to-value parameters to zero. The Binance response worked, and Adam praises the team for rapidly opening a war room, preparing the transaction, and gathering signatures. However, he warns that AI agents are increasingly scanning for exploits, so manual coordination may not be fast enough. He proposes automated, verifiable risk controls that can react quickly while remaining bounded by rules set by Aave governance.

Kain warns that adding risk machinery can create new risks

Kain pushes back on the instinct to add more off-chain signals and controls to Aave, arguing that complexity itself can be dangerous in a system that has become stable through incremental additions. Adam answers that Aave would not surrender unrestricted control to a risk provider: intermediary contracts can constrain which parameters may change, how often changes occur, and how large they can be. He says the goal is for the protocol to retain ownership and the ability to revoke delegation. Both agree there is no free lunch between immutability, adaptability, speed, and sophisticated risk management.

Oracles are judgments, not objective asset prices

The hosts and Adam discuss why price feeds are harder than simply reading a market price. Kain says an asset’s price depends on liquidity, the seller’s motivation, and market conditions; a mid-market exchange quote may be stale or unusable during a crisis. Adam says even crypto feeds embed methodological choices such as median or volume-weighted aggregation. Tokenized stocks add normal trading hours, overnight sessions, early-morning sessions, different exchanges, and uneven liquidity. LlamaRisk is working with Chainlink’s runtime environment to implement custom risk and pricing logic rather than treating the oracle infrastructure as a complete risk-management solution.

An AI model found a way for Synthetix to recover stolen SNX

Kain recounts how Synthetix reconsidered its long-standing assumption that stolen SNX could not be recovered. The team identified roughly 9 million stolen SNX and, prompted by the scale and North Korean attribution, asked from first principles what authority the protocol actually had. An AI model suggested using the token authority to create an approval and transfer the tokens to the DAO, rather than replacing the entire token state or contract. Kain says the solution was simple but had never occurred to the team because earlier discussions had effectively closed off that line of thought.

Taylor says THORChain processed sanctioned North Korean funds

Taylor describes a one-block Ethereum reorganization that caused THORChain to double-spend during the laundering effort. The network shut down, issued an update, and restarted after node operators voted, but the underlying incident exposed a basic weakness: swaps must account for reorgs and uncle blocks. The FBI, IRS Criminal Investigation, and Secret Service later attributed the Binance theft to TraderTraitor, a North Korean group, and explicitly asked THORChain node operators to block the stolen assets. Taylor says operators publicly acknowledged the warning but then processed nearly $200 million in subsequent North Korean flows, potentially creating serious sanctions and criminal-liability exposure.

A French bank theft showed the limits of freezing crypto quickly

The hosts discuss a separate French bank incident involving roughly $235 billion in assets and an external attack that allegedly moved about $30 million through bank accounts and then cryptocurrency exchanges. ZachXBT traced and clustered the on-chain activity and warned centralized exchanges, but could not get funds frozen because the bank had not yet publicly identified itself as the victim. Kain jokes that banks’ money is also largely database entries, but says the problem becomes harder when those entries connect directly to crypto and can be rapidly converted into assets that cannot simply be reversed. The episode closes with hopes that Ethereum’s roadmap will accelerate rather than remain aimed at 2030.

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Show notes

The $6B Binance hack sent stolen funds through Aave. LlamaRisk CEO Adam Sadowski walks through the market freeze and why nothing was taken from the protocol.

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North Korean hackers pulled roughly $6 billion out of Binance, and within minutes Tether and Circle were freezing stablecoins as the attackers raced to swap into ETH, routing part of the haul through Aave.

Adam Sadowski, CEO of LlamaRisk, Aave's risk provider, joins Kain Warwick and Taylor Monahan to walk through the overnight market freeze, why nothing was stolen from Aave, and whether anyone should be able to deposit $1 billion and borrow all the ETH in a single block.

They also cover Aave's 4-of-7 guardian multisig, AI agents hunting for exploits, why Kain says there is no such thing as the price of an asset, how an AI model helped Synthetix recover 9 million stolen SNX, and Taylor's warning after THORChain processed nearly $200 million for North Korea despite an FBI callout. Once a protocol has the power to stop a theft, can it still choose not to?

Hosts:

⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Kain Warwick⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ - Host of Uneasy Money and Founder of Infinex and Synthetix

⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Taylor Monahan⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ - Co-host of Uneasy Money and Security Expert⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠

Guest:

⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Adam Sadowski - CEO of LlamaRisk

Timestamps

🎬 00:00 Intro

📋 00:22 Unchained Survey: complete the listener survey at https://unchainedcrypto.com/survey

🎙️ 01:17 Bits + Bips: search Bits + Bips and subscribe to our weekly crypto and macro show at https://www.youtube.com/@Bitsandbips

🚨 01:49 The $6B Binance hack and how Tether and Circle froze funds in minutes

🔍 10:16 How the Binance hacker routed $60M in USDT through Aave to borrow ETH

⚖️ 14:16 Should anyone be able to deposit $1B and borrow all the ETH in one block?

💰 23:18 Nexo: Generate daily interest on your crypto or borrow funds against your assets at https://unchainedcrypto.com/go/nexo-podcast-yt

🤝 24:00 Why Kain ranks the Binance response among crypto's best anti-heist efforts

🛡️ 27:51 Aave's guardians, risk stewards, and the race against AI exploit agents

🧩 31:40 Why Kain thinks adding complexity is the most dangerous move for Aave

📈 37:23 Who decides the price? Oracles, tokenized stocks, and Chainlink CRE

🪙 44:57 How an AI model found Synthetix a way to recover 9M stolen SNX

⛓️ 54:42 How a one-block Ethereum reorg made THORChain double spend mid-hack

🚔 01:00:41 Why Taylor fears the FBI callout could send Thor node operators to prison

🏦 01:07:24 A French bank heist, ZachXBT, and the $30M that couldn't be frozen
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