Brazil’s Election Comeback and What America Can Learn

Laura Jáner introduces Brazil’s election as a result few expected: left-wing incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, 51.8% to 48.2%. Lula lost the first round, then won the runoff by 3.5 percentage points, or roughly four million votes, becoming Brazil’s first four-term president and the first candidate since direct elections returned in 1989 to lose the opening round and win the runoff. The victory ran against a broader Latin American shift to the right, but Lula will face Brazil’s most conservative Congress since democratization and a strained economy.

Brian Winter says the United States and Brazil are the two largest democracies in the Western Hemisphere, and Brazil contains roughly two-thirds of the Amazon rainforest. He also points to the political parallels that emerged after Donald Trump’s 2016 election and Jair Bolsonaro’s 2018 election, despite his earlier insistence that Brazil should not be viewed through an American lens. Brazil’s scale adds to its importance: it has more than 213 million people, Latin America’s largest economy, the world’s largest coffee-export industry, and supplies about one-third of the coffee consumed by Americans.

Lula gained about 10 million votes between rounds, compared with roughly 3.6 million for Flávio, helped by turnout and voters from eliminated candidates. During the interval, Congress approved a constitutional amendment ending the six-day workweek without pay cuts; Lula increased Bolsa Família payments six days before voting, cut federal gasoline taxes, and launched debt relief. Winter says those measures amounted to more than $40 billion in tax breaks and additional welfare spending, upsetting financial markets that had priced in a Bolsonaro victory. He calls the result humbling because even Lula’s camp expected, at best, a narrow win.

Winter identifies Lula’s digital operation as the clearest explanation for the reversal. Lula, 80, acquired his first smartphone only in the final two weeks, while young aides persuaded him to let Congressman André Janones run an aggressive online effort centered on WhatsApp, Instagram, and TikTok. Janones renamed a roughly 50,000-person group “Lula’s Army,” supplied constant content, and expanded it to 10 million members by election day. Brazil’s unusually high social-media engagement—one study cited an average of more than six hours a day—made the country especially receptive. Winter says politicians across Latin America are already asking how to copy the model.

Jáner asks whether voters chose Lula or simply rejected the Bolsonaro name, which was damaged by Jair Bolsonaro’s attempted coup and his 27-year prison sentence. Winter says runoff elections often become votes against the feared candidate, but Lula’s personal story also mattered. Lula has been central to Brazilian politics for about 50 years, beginning as a metalworkers’ union leader during dictatorship, losing three presidential races before winning in 2002, and rising from poverty after selling oranges and cashews in São Paulo. His connection to working-class voters helped him assemble one more winning campaign, although Winter says the exact balance between affection and anti-Bolsonaro fear remains unclear.

Jáner describes corruption as a longstanding problem involving both sides, citing Lula’s overturned conviction, Jair Bolsonaro’s coup conviction, an investigation involving Flávio, and the Banco Master scandal. Winter compares Brazil’s Lava Jato corruption investigations of the 2010s with newer scandals that appeared to reach politicians and business leaders across the political spectrum, while acknowledging corruption also exists in U.S. politics. He says Brazil needs a judicial system that applies justice more equally. During this campaign, corruption seemed briefly like the defining issue before voters shifted toward culture-war questions, household finances, and fears about democracy under the Bolsonaro family.

Jáner contrasts Brazil’s strong headline indicators with voter frustration: unemployment was low, inflation was about 4%, but 49% of respondents said the economy had worsened and only 19% said it had improved. Nearly four in ten workers operate informally, almost two million drive or deliver full-time for apps, and roughly 84 million people are behind on debt payments. Winter says formal-sector jobs once offered a “carteira assinada,” a signed employment record that symbolized security and status, but industrial work eroded through competition, especially from China. Some gig work is necessary, he says, while some Brazilians now prefer working for themselves.

Winter rejects the familiar word “potential,” calling Brazil’s advantages concrete opportunities: it is a leading producer of food, beef, soy, iron ore, and oil, and its distance from global conflict zones lets it maintain commercial relationships with many countries. He is nevertheless cautious about the near term. Households reportedly spend about 30% of income servicing debt, including credit-card balances and money lost through betting apps; Lula must also manage government debt and a Congress far more conservative than he is. Winter expects 2027 could be difficult even though he believes Brazil’s longer-term outlook is brighter.

Winter attributes Lula’s victory partly to the Bolsonaro family’s weakened leadership and partly to Lula’s willingness to move right. Lula avoided supporting abortion rights despite pressure from the left because polling showed roughly 70% of Brazilians opposed them, and he endorsed lowering the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16 late in the campaign. Winter says Brazil may have reelected a leftist president while remaining broadly right of center, a point echoed by Jáner’s reference to research in O Brasil no Espelho. Lula’s success will depend on recognizing that conservative influence remains strong.