This Is Your Midterm Cheat Sheet

Host John Bickley opens by noting that Election Day is only two days away and asks Daily Wire opinion editor Ben Dominich and DC Bureau Chief Tim Rice to look back at the biggest surprises of the cycle. Rice immediately points to the Maine race involving Graham Plattner and Republican Senator Susan Collins. Democrats appeared to have found a candidate who could finally defeat Collins, but Plattner’s campaign imploded after Reddit posts resurfaced, including allegations that he had participated in a creepy-pervert chat room. Rice calls it a major early Democratic loss and one of the cycle’s most spectacular collapses. Dominich broadens the discussion beyond one candidate. He says many observers expected the Iran war and possible gas-price increases to dominate the final weeks, but AI became a much bigger campaign issue than anticipated. Republicans had promoted their states—especially Texas—as centers of AI development, yet Democrats successfully made data centers, energy use, and the president’s ties to Silicon Valley billionaires into liabilities. Dominich says Republicans were caught on the defensive because the president was personally invested in the issue and they could not create much messaging distance from him. The hosts also argue that Democrats have played both sides of AI. They present themselves as pro-technology while supporting pauses or restrictions on some projects. Rice says Democrats have used the issue effectively, while Dominich predicts that if Democrats win the House or Senate, AI money will begin flowing toward them too, creating a problem for the party that currently benefits from the issue.

Bickley says he has seen many AI-focused Democratic advertisements in Tennessee and asks whether they would work on a nonpartisan viewer. Rice agrees that the ads have been unusually effective. The discussion identifies Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro as an example of a Democrat who was ahead on the issue, while Republican governors responded by saying they would press pause on some AI-related developments. Similar messaging has appeared in Texas, including against James Tallarico. Dominich argues that the ads work partly because Republicans cannot easily separate themselves from the president’s support for AI and Silicon Valley interests. Democrats, he says, do not actually have a clear plan to eliminate the need for American data centers, but they can still “demagogue” the issue and benefit electorally from public uncertainty. Rice adds that many voters do not yet know how they feel about AI, giving campaigns room to define the issue through emotionally effective advertising. The broader lesson, according to the guests, is that Democrats unexpectedly found a campaign subject that connected technology, electricity, local development, and the president. Republicans expected to lead on AI and economic growth, but their ownership of the issue made them vulnerable when voters became concerned about its costs and consequences.

Asked which races deserve the closest attention, Rice first brackets off the heavily covered contests in Michigan and Texas, including the Tallarico–Paxton and Mike Rogers–Abdul El-Sayed races. He then returns to Maine, where he personally expects Susan Collins to win despite the closeness. Rice jokes that Collins wins impossible elections and then spends six years making Republicans angry, but he emphasizes that the race remains capable of producing a surprise. He also highlights Alaska. The state became more nationally important after both the president and vice president traveled there, signaling concern about losing it. Rice says a New York Times report revealed that Mary Peltola’s campaign and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee were behind the “double Dan Sullivan” strategy, intended to complicate ranked-choice voting in Peltola’s favor. Even if the Alaska race ends in a blowout, Rice expects the alleged strategy to remain one of the cycle’s lasting stories. Dominich focuses on candidate recruitment. He says Democrats did a strong job selecting candidates who could appear moderate or politically viable, citing the possibility that Texas might have produced a Jasmine Crockett race instead of James Tallarico. Republicans, meanwhile, handled redistricting fights well and initially had a major financial advantage. But Dominich says they failed to anticipate a decline in the president’s support among Hispanic voters, which made newly redistricted House seats more competitive. He also questions whether campaign money still has the same effect it once did.

Bickley notes that midterms have historically punished the party in power, while Republicans have a spending advantage and an unusually active president. Rice says Trump’s final campaign tour helped turn the tide but did not fully reverse it. He expects Republicans to suffer losses and says they should prepare for a difficult night, but he considers reports of a Democratic “blue wave” or total Republican implosion exaggerated. He argues that polling has often been unreliable or even fabricated in Democrats’ favor, and that midterm forecasts frequently swing between extreme predictions before ending closer than expected. Rice says Trump’s direct appeal—effectively asking voters to “pretend I’m on the ballot”—probably brought back voters who supported him in 2024 because they were tired of Biden-Harris policies but were not committed MAGA activists. Republicans had difficulty using that argument this year because Trump is now president and because Democrats nominated several candidates who openly embraced policies Republicans would otherwise label extreme. Rice’s conclusion is that more Trump involvement was better for Republicans than less, although it may not be enough to preserve both chambers of Congress. Dominich agrees that Trump stopped much of the Republican bleeding but says the party’s position remains troubling. Republicans are not competitive in North Carolina or Georgia, and they have largely withdrawn from those Senate contests even though a stronger cycle would have allowed them to spend money elsewhere. He says Darlene Graham should still win in South Carolina, but the fact that the race became close in a solidly red state is itself concerning. The unresolved question is whether Trump’s supporters will turn out for less exciting Republican candidates.

Bickley asks whether prediction markets are more reliable than traditional polls, especially after two fake-poll scandals and a broader loss of trust in pollsters. He points listeners to the Daily Wire Election Hub, which displays both polls and prediction markets. Rice explains that prediction markets differ because participants put money behind their forecasts. In theory, someone who expects Darlene Graham to win in South Carolina can bet on her, and a rising market price indicates that more participants expect her to prevail. Rice immediately qualifies that argument. Anyone can bet in a prediction market, regardless of whether they live in the state being contested, and bettors are probably using the same polls, news, and analysis that everyone else is using. He compares the relationship to sports: someone betting on a football game may first consult ESPN, so the betting odds are not necessarily independent of ESPN’s analysis. Because this is the first election in which both tools are being widely compared, Rice says it is not yet clear which is more accurate. Dominich adds that prediction markets can miss late-breaking developments. People who placed bets on Alaska a month earlier may have changed their view after the week’s new reporting, just as an injury report can change sports odds. He warns that “smarter money” is not necessarily smart money: some participants make long-range bets or speculative wagers hoping to profit from an unexpected outcome. At the same time, he says polling is badly broken because cheap, low-quality polls are easier to produce than ever, contaminating averages and poll aggregators.

In the final substantive question, Bickley asks whether Trump would change his agenda after the election. Rice says the answer depends on the scale of Democratic gains. If Democrats win one or both chambers, Trump may shift sharply, using executive orders and trying to push through as much as possible during a lame-duck period when legislation becomes harder. A Democratic Congress would likely investigate Trump, his cabinet, and his family and call for impeachment, putting the White House into a defensive posture. Rice notes that Trump often responds to being defensive by going on offense. Dominich predicts an immediate campaign by Trump to protect or regain Senate control, especially if the chamber moves toward a 50–50 balance. He expects Trump to pressure departing senators and push any remaining agenda items onto the legislative table, while becoming frustrated with resistance from Senate leaders such as John Thune. Over the longer term, Dominich foresees Democrats presenting their congressional investigations as an anti-corruption campaign, targeting people close to Trump and selecting high-profile hearings designed to frustrate his agenda. Trump could respond through executive action and aggressive foreign policy. Both guests say a Democratic victory would also reshape the Democratic Party itself. New House members who won primaries from more radical positions would challenge Hakeem Jeffries and push the party left on many policy areas. Dominich believes this could give Republicans a clearer target: an agenda that looks like a radical overreach to much of the country. That would be especially significant because, in his view, the election is likely to be driven primarily by economic concerns and gas prices rather than ideology.