Expanding America’s space capabilities. [T-Minus: Space-Cyber Briefing]

Host Maria Varmazis and producer Ethan Cook continue their discussion of executive actions from the second Trump administration, shifting from broad space priorities to workforce and technical capabilities. They note that the phrase “space cybersecurity” does not usually appear directly in executive orders; instead, space appears inside broader cybersecurity measures. Cook chooses the action that stood out most to him: establishing the United States Space Academy. Cook says the space sector faces the general cybersecurity workforce shortage, but also a specialized knowledge problem. Space systems are unlike most other sectors: satellites cannot simply be physically accessed once deployed, and some infrastructure has been operating for 40 or 50 years and cannot be replaced in the same way as a hospital or terrestrial critical-infrastructure system. Operators also cannot easily enter a building and add conventional perimeter defenses. That combination makes the field difficult for both new and experienced cybersecurity professionals to enter. Varmazis adds that people interested in space cybersecurity are often told to “go back in time and join the military,” an unsatisfying pathway for those who cannot or do not want to do that. They conclude that a dedicated educational route could address both the cybersecurity labor gap and the broader lack of understanding about how space missions work.

Varmazis initially jokes that the United States Space Academy sounds like “Starfleet Academy,” but the hosts explain that it is not the United States Space Force Academy and would not be an exclusively military institution. They clarify that the action is technically a proclamation rather than an executive order. Cook characterizes a proclamation as less binding and easier to issue than an executive order, though they acknowledge that a lawyer might provide more precise legal nuance. The proclamation, titled “Establishing the United States Space Academy,” was released on August 28, 2026, according to the discussion. Its Section 3 says a commission will advise and assist the president on proposals for a NASA-led federal academy combining rigorous technical education with leadership development, discipline, and a durable commitment to public service. The stated goal is to develop “civically grounded leaders” prepared to advance American interests in space. The proposal includes service obligations for graduates, potentially in the armed forces or civilian federal service, but does not require every student to enter the military. The hosts describe possible participation by commercial companies or civilian agencies, including someone in the Department of the Interior’s IT-security organization. If funded and successfully implemented, they say, the academy could teach space mission operations, cybersecurity, engineering, and the practical skills needed to build systems that must remain secure for decades. They also see it as a way to challenge the assumption that the only space career is becoming an astronaut.

Cook interprets the Space Academy proposal as a direct acknowledgment that the workforce gap exists and that the government intends to put resources behind addressing it. He says making the effort broadly accessible rather than purely military-led could prevent the gap from becoming worse, because a military-only pipeline would exclude many potential workers. Varmazis agrees that space cybersecurity cannot be separated from knowledge of the space domain itself. People may understand cybersecurity but still lack an accessible way to learn how spacecraft, missions, ground systems, and long-lived orbital infrastructure actually function. Military service has historically been one of the clearest routes into that institutional knowledge, but it is not an option for everyone. They also emphasize that the proposed academy could support more than immediate workforce training. It could help develop the systems and technologies that will be used over the next 20 to 30 years, bring civilian and commercial perspectives into space capability planning, and provide pathways for people who want to support space missions without physically going into orbit. The hosts caution that the proposal was only a month or two old at the time of recording and that they did not know its funding or implementation status, so its practical impact remains a wait-and-see matter.

After the Space Academy discussion, Varmazis and Cook turn to two cybersecurity-related executive orders that mention space. They identify them as Executive Order 14412, “Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks,” and Executive Order 14413, “Ushering in the Next Frontier of Quantum Innovation,” both dated June 22, 2026 in the conversation. Cook says the orders are closely related: one focuses primarily on defense against cryptographic threats, while the other focuses on innovation and development. Cook argues that cryptography will be foundational to the next decade or more of technological advancement and disruption. Quantum computing could eventually undermine existing cryptographic algorithms, while “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks involve collecting encrypted information that cannot be broken today but may be decrypted in the future. He says the United States was behind the curve when artificial intelligence emerged and is trying to get ahead of quantum risks earlier. Unlike AI, quantum technology is not presented as a general-purpose system that will create projects or think independently; its importance lies in changing security, communications, and scientific capabilities. The hosts note that NIST has already issued post-quantum guidance urging organizations, especially those tied to government, the military, or sensitive sectors, to begin implementing protections rather than merely discussing them. Cook says the post-quantum transition is already underway, despite the industry joke that quantum has been “coming” for 20 years.

Varmazis finds NASA mentioned in the procurement section of the advanced-cryptographic-attacks order. The section involves the Office of Management and Budget director, the secretary of war, NASA’s administrator, and the General Services Administration administrator, in consultation with other security and standards officials, coordinating cost-saving opportunities and implementing a migration policy and strategy for post-quantum cryptography. The hosts connect NASA’s role to the sensitive data moving through space systems and to the need to protect both existing assets and future spacecraft. The second order, on quantum innovation, directs the assistant to the president for science and technology to coordinate with NASA, the NSA, and other agencies on the QCADDS effort: the “Quantum Computer for Applications Development and Discovery Science” effort. The stated objective is to enable a quantum computer at a scale capable of beginning an era of quantum-enabled scientific discovery, including delivering at least one such computer to a Department of Energy facility and making it available to the scientific community where possible. The order also directs NASA to develop a plan for civilian quantum sensing and networking for space applications. Cook says the broader aim is to move quantum technology from theory and capability into operational use, with the right scientific expertise and systems in place. The hosts interpret the two orders together as a plan to defend against quantum-enabled attacks while also using quantum technologies for research, communications, sensing, and future space missions. They stress that the episode covered only selected space-related actions, not every relevant executive order.