Ordering a new space policy. [T-Minus: Space-Cyber Briefing]

Host Maria Varmazas opens by explaining that T-Minus is shifting from recent technical discussions to a two-part deep dive on space policy. Her guest is the show’s producer, Ethan Cook, who also works on the policy-focused podcast Caveat. Cook describes his background in history and political science and says he studies not only what governments do, but why they do it, what authority they have, and where decisions may lead from a historical perspective. The pair decided to examine President Trump’s second-administration executive orders on space after realizing that the volume of orders was becoming difficult even for them to track. Maria argues that the subject matters internationally because the United States, with China close behind, launches more objects into space than any other country, while many other nations rely on U.S. launch and space capabilities. Consequently, U.S. decisions about space policy and cybersecurity can affect commercial and governmental space activity well beyond U.S. borders. The episode will focus on two recent orders rather than attempt a chronological catalogue of every space-related order.

Before discussing space, Maria asks Cook to explain what an executive order is. He emphasizes that it is not a law passed by Congress: it is a written directive from the executive branch, usually the president, telling federal departments and agencies to take specified actions. A legally valid order is treated as having the force of law, but executive orders can be challenged in court and do not have the same durability as legislation enacted by Congress. Cook says executive orders were originally intended to let presidents manage the executive branch without asking Congress to approve every administrative action, such as creating or organizing agencies and sub-agencies. Their use has become more aggressive as congressional gridlock has worsened, allowing administrations to pursue policy agendas without waiting for legislation. However, a new president can revoke or replace prior orders, which makes them temporary instruments rather than permanent policy. Maria summarizes them as having “some teeth, but not a full jaw set of teeth” like a congressional law: stronger than a suggestion or memo, but less durable. Cook explains that executive orders can require agencies to audit systems, report findings within a deadline, coordinate across agencies, direct attention and funding priorities, or establish what kinds of contracting and cooperation are permitted. They also set a public tone for federal agencies, private companies, political allies, and international partners. Congress still controls appropriations and must approve many senior appointments, so an order cannot simply create unlimited funding or bypass every legislative constraint.

The first order discussed is “Ensuring American Space Superiority,” identified as Executive Order 14,369 and dated December 18, 2025. Cook calls it a broad tone-setter rather than a document that spells out every immediate implementation step. It addresses national security, commercial investment, and the overall U.S. space strategy, presenting several major priorities that the administration may develop further over the following months and years. The order emphasizes returning Americans to space and having the United States lead the space race to Mars throughout the 2030s, beginning the groundwork for those missions. Its most striking objective, according to both speakers, is establishing a permanent lunar outpost. Maria says this signals that the administration is not merely seeking more satellites or launches, but a lasting human foothold on the Moon. She notes that the lunar-base goal has also been advocated for years by space companies and industry participants, making the executive order closely aligned with existing commercial ambitions. Maria points out that the order’s long list also touches Golden Dome, national-security space, spectrum allocation, and nuclear power in space. In this context, “space security” is broader than cybersecurity: it can mean protecting physical space assets or using space systems for security. Nevertheless, the hosts say cybersecurity is inherent in the agenda because every space system and supporting ground infrastructure must be secured. The order does not itself provide funding, but it can signal to private companies that the administration wants proposals and partnerships in these areas.

After the mid-episode break, Maria returns to the order’s statement that the administration will focus space policy on expanding human reach and American presence in space. She describes it as a “shopping list” of priorities that many space advocates have wanted to see, including a lunar base, Mars exploration, Golden Dome, spectrum policy, and national-security objectives. Cook stresses that the president cannot use an executive order to grant the administration an additional $50 billion; Congress remains responsible for appropriating money. What the order can do is tell private industry where federal agencies intend to concentrate attention and potential contracts. Cook gives the example of companies developing permanent lunar capabilities: agencies can use the policy direction to seek partnerships and decide which providers should receive contracts, while companies can determine whether their products or services fit the administration’s stated goals. Maria links this to the practical importance of policy alignment: when industry and the executive branch are publicly pursuing the same objectives, the administration has a clearer basis for seeking congressional funding and private-sector participation. Cook also highlights the order’s call for space-acquisition reform. He interprets this as an effort to reduce federal delays in buying technology and making deals. Agencies may otherwise spend a year navigating review and procurement processes only to acquire technology that has already been overtaken by a newer system. Maria says this reflects a longstanding complaint from military customers: private-sector innovation moves quickly, U.S. adversaries are not slowing down, and government procurement often cannot keep pace.

The second order is “Enabling Competition in the Commercial Space Industry,” identified as Executive Order 14,335 and dated August 13, 2025. Cook says its stated purpose is to make the domestic commercial space sector more diverse, encourage innovation, and reduce the need for the federal government to build and operate every capability internally. Instead of hiring engineers into government agencies and waiting for new projects to mature, the government can buy products and services from companies that already employ the necessary talent. Cook acknowledges the trade-off: relying more heavily on private companies can give substantial influence to a small number of space vendors, with Starlink as his example. Still, he argues that commercial systems such as Starlink have materially advanced the state of space capabilities, so dismissing their importance would ignore reality. Maria says the order contains substantial legal and regulatory detail, including a section titled “Reforming Regulatory Leadership and Accountability.” Consistent with the administration’s broader preference for deregulation, the order seeks to change how regulation is managed rather than simply accept existing processes. One provision Maria identifies would, within 60 days, elevate the Office of Space Commerce into the Office of the Secretary of Commerce. Both speakers view that as a meaningful increase in the seniority and visibility of space commerce within the federal government. They connect the change to a rapidly expanding global market in which India, Europe, Australia, Japan, and China are increasing their capabilities. Companies have sometimes found U.S. regulations and procedures too burdensome and have taken launches or other activities elsewhere. The hosts see the order as timely, though they say it is too early to know whether it will actually speed up the industry or reduce regulatory barriers.